President Nixon: Toughing It Out with the Law
by William Van Alstyne

An exponent of toughing it out with the law, President
Nixon makes such vast and startling claims to
executive authority that the issue is changed from
one of political judgment to the counterfeit issue of
constitutional authority, This conduct has obscured
the true issues in Supreme Court nominations, war
powers, executive impoundment of funds, and
executive privilege in the tapes controversy.

N THE CASE of the Watergate tapes, President
Nixon engaged in toughing it out with the law. In
his own terms, this is a highly principled thing to dostanding on his authority as president, protecting the
powers of the office from erosion, resisting pressures
from Congress and the press, standing tall in the courts.
This was his reiterated position as he attempted to make
plain why nondisclosure of the tapes was required by
the imperatives of candor and frankness in White House
conversations.
The issue, as he put it, was not the lesser one of the
possible value of the tapes to the Senate select committee or the special prosecutor, but the more enduring
one of proper authority. To yield the tapes would be
to violate the confidence of all persons having conversation with the president, even on the most sensitive issues, and to impair irreparably the operation of his office. The people must somehow be made to understand
the problem in these impersonal and constitutional
terms. They must be made to understand this even if
it means discharging prosecutors and attorneys general.
As I listen to the president, however, I cannot avoid
an uneasy feeling of drja vu. Something about the situation does not quite hang together, and the unmentioned
facts, once remembered, begin to take shape with similar
uses he has made of toughing it out with the law.
In 1971 I combed through a decade of federal case
reporters attempting to gain some perspective on the
judicial decisions of G. Harrold Carswell, who was then
under consideration before the Senate Judiciary Committee for appointment to the Supreme Court. I had
a degree of personal interest in Judge Carswell's nomination, having previously thought a great deal about the
earlier nomination of Clement F. Hayusworth, Jr.,
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whose confirmation I had supported in testimony before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. (In fact, I continue to
believe that Judge Haynsworth would have served with
distinction on the Supreme Court.)
In 1972 1 was in the law library again, for a longer
time, in an effort to trace the constitutional history of
the war power.
Only a few months ago I looked up materials that
might help me understand the basis for President Nixon's claim that somehow enabled him to impound funds
Congress had appropriated to be spent. Somewhere in
between, I had also been there to see whether, as the
president claimed, he enjoyed an executive privilege to
engage in domestic wiretapping without authorization
by Congress or constitutional review by the courts.
Nixon Changed Issues, Deflected Attention
In each of these situations certain circumstances were
repeated. For instance, in each President Nixon asserted
a claim of, constitutional authority that was itself so vast
and startling as virtually to cause a shift in attention by
an escalation of the issue. It was no longer a question
of the propriety or merits of his position as a political
matter but a larger and very different question of authority: not whether power was being used wisely and sensitively, but whether it existed on the colossal scale the
president claimed.
Coincidence or not, escalation of the issue was adroitly employed to subdue criticism of the president's personal judgment, deflecting public attention away from
the merits of what he was doing to the different matter
of his technical authority to do it. Moreover, on those
occasions when the courts rejected the transmogrified
issue of authority, finding it without constitutional basis,
even that conclusion was used to political advantage.
The president would transfer the onus of "misunderstanding" to the judiciary, taking the high ground that
he merely had tried faithfully to vindicate the responsibilities of his office, but that the judiciary had tied
his hands.
In the case of the Watergate tapes, this political technique again repeated itself. Executive privilege, whatever its scope, is at most what the words suggest-a
privilege or option the president has and not a duty.
There is no requirement that it be asserted. When presidents have thought it important to remove doubt and to
assist other departments of government in their undertakings, materials subject to the privilege have been re-
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leased willingly. The privilege is hardly ravaged by the
exercise of discretion in taking recourse to it; rather, it
stands more to be thrown into disrepute by its selective
use, as in the Watergate affair, when it has the appearance of a cover-up.
Who Can Exercise "Executive Privilege"?
Second, the privilege is that of the president-not of
anyone who happens to converse with him. It is emphatically dissimilar to other privileges the president
used for comparison in his televised address of August
14, such as the privilege of a client not to have his attorney divulge certain matters without the client's permission (but note, even this does not run to statements
of intention to violate the law), or of a patient not to
have his physician disclose certain matters without his
permission and relevant to his diagnosis. In respect to
executive privilege, however, it is perfectly well understood that no one has a legal claim of curtaining anything he may have told the president from disclosure
when the president thinks it in the public interest to
report it.

Third, the president's use of the privilege in this instance was markedly at odds with his public commitment
made before existence of the tapes was known that, in
view of the fact that sufficient evidence respecting the
appearance of White House involvement in criminal
activities had accumulated, it would be his policy to
reopen the investigation and co-operate with the select
committee and the special prosecutor to restore public
confidence. It is remarkable to think in what way the
withholding of the tapes could have fitted that earlier
description of the national interest.
Fourth, there is the fact that the president already had
breached the confidences of parties to the conversations,
not only releasing each person to testify as to what he
said but also as to what others present during the same
meeting said. even going so far as to lend certain
among the tapes to H. R. Haldeman for Mr. Haldeman's appearance before the select committee. In essence, the president said that the national interest is best
served by a self-serving breach of some person's confidence and the personal loan of the corroborative tapes
to a person he knew would testify that the disputed substance of certain conversations confirmed his own version.
Nixon Could Have Confined His Objections
Finally, insofar as there may be portions of the tapes
bearing on extraneous matters truly not pertinent to the
business of the select committee or the special prosecutor, the president could have confined his objection
to these. In case of a direct challenge that under the
circumstances it would not be appropriate for the president alone to say which portions of which tapes were
truly irrelevant (any more, say, than it would be appropriate for the select committee or the prosecutor to
make that determination unilaterally), a federal court
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could provide an in camera review, exactly as has been
done in similar disputes respecting the relevance of information sought on discovery when its examination by
an outside party has been thought to be not necessary
and possibly prejudicial. This was essentially the position taken by the decision of Chief Judge John J. Sirica
of the United States district court in his decision of August 29 (360 F.Supp. 1), which was affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on October 12. But President Nixon
chose not to pursue his position in the Supreme Court.
The transmogrification of the issue to one of constitutional power is, in consequence, utterly counterfeit. Now
that the claim of absolute privilege has been made, we
cannot help but be interested in its judicial outcome. To
suppose that the outcome of the legal issue in any way
affects the original question of the way in which the
president tends to conduct himself, however, is unquestionably to be gulled once again.
Taken even at face value, moreover, the many constitutional claims have themselves been remarkable, and
here again there is a striking similarity with the way in
which the president is toughing it out with the law by
escalating the character of his claim to the point where
it is the claim itself, rather than his conduct, that gradually captures the news and deflects attention. Perhaps
nowhere was this bettor illustrated than in the Carswell
nomination.
As the Senate was coming down to the wire on that
nomination, the president sought to deflect criticism of
his judgment by insisting that the "real" issue was simply
one of executive prerogative versus congressional usurpation. Wasn't it clear, he emphasized, that the Constitution committed the power of Supreme Court appointments to the president? It was as though he wanted only to vindicate the responsibility of the office itself, acting as a dedicated surrogate of all presidents,
past and future, determined to preserve their powers
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against inroads by a jealous and partisan Senate. Judge
Carswell was not the issue; rather, the issue was the
Constitution. Redefined in that way, couldn't the public readily understand that, whatever the questioned
merit of the nomination, it really wasn't the Senate's
just concern?
But it was the Senate's concern, however the president sought to persuade us otherwise. In fact, it turned
out that the president had misquoted the Constitution,
substituting a power to "appoint" for the lesser power to
"nominate" and eliding the part of the clause in the
Constitution that refers to the Senate's "consent."
The other aspect of toughing it out with the law-the
shifting of responsibility for the consequences after deflecting attention away from the original issue--also is
apparent. The federal judiciary has been especially
handy for this purpose, even more so than Congress.
In 1970 Congress had made no provision for wiretapping or bugging suspected domestic dissidents without judicial authorization or accountability, but the
president again was alert to his own responsibilities.
"Separation of powers" and his prerogatives as chief
executive precluded the courts from applying Fourth
Amendment restrictions, he said. The president alone,
unaccountable to anyone save at election time or by
impeachment, assuming it could somehow be learned
what the president was doing, would determine the occasions, groups, and persons to be surreptitiously monitored in the national interest.
"At Least He Had Done His Own Duty"
In 1972 the Supreme Court rejected this view (407
U.S. 297). denying that the Fourth Amendment exempteid the executive from its provisions whenever he
might claim that domestic security warranted invasions
of privacy without judicial authorization, but still the
president seeks vindication from the result. He has implied that the Court's decision is startling (although the
lower courts had already held the same way, and, so far
as I could determine, professional opinion regarded
the president's own view as the only startling one),
weakening to the public security, and possibly even subject to the nfdive constitutionalism that characterized the
anti-law-and-order excesses of the Warren Court. At
least, he reassured us, he had tried to do his own duty
to his office by his unflinching efforts of domestic
surveillance.
I followed each of these issues with earnest academic
interest, a little incredulous each time at the. president's
stated view of his own power, occasionally uneasy in
the uncertainty that one or another court might be persuaded to his view (or that he might succeed in restaffing the Supreme Court with more compliant justices), but more nearly reassured when the "crisis" was
past, and executive supremacy had not yet been read
into the Constitution. But the recovery period was always shortlived.
The president plied the same approach again when
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he presumed to impound funds appropriated by Congress for disbursement. Did the president really possess
a double veto over acts of Congress? I was aware of the
provision in Article I allowing a power of veto, but
that, of course, is explicitly subject to being overridden
by two-thirds majorities of both houses. Could there
possibly be another, as the president claimed, nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution but somehow implied in
the office of the presidency-a double-speak prerogative to take care that the laws be "faithfully ignored"
rather than "faithfully executed," as the language in
Article II declares?
Judiciary Will Bear the Blame
Thus far, the courts have held overwhelmingly against
this view, although the matter has not yet been decided
by the Supreme Court. Evidently speaking for the president, Caspar Weinberger, secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, discounted the, numerous decisions against the president, making clear
that nothing less than a decision by the Supreme Court
would alter the president's course on this issue. Only if
that Court will take responsibility will he desist, with
the canny consolation of having depersonalized the issue
and thrust the blame onto the judiciary.
Consider also the remarkable uses of "constitutional
responsibility" the president's actions have reflected in
Cambodia. A short time ago he stood tall against Congress in reassuring the country that should Congress
forbid the use of funds for further military action in
Cambodia, he was prepared to meet the responsibilities
of his own office by diverting other appropriations already made. His presidential duty required no less of
him, whatever might be lacking in Congress.
Only was it later to be learned that previous representations that the neutrality of Cambodia was being
scrupulously respected were utterly false; that the president had authorized large scale bombing concealed beneath duplicitous reports for the benefit of several congressional committees that presumably might not have
been trusted with the truth. Was this, too, merely a
question of "privilege" or "authority"? Back in January
of 1971, moreover, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf
resolutida, under which President Johnson supported
his original actions in that area, but President Nixon
was quick to point out that he never regarded that resolution of any importance to his authority.
Watergate: An Issue Elevated to a Crisis
The cases involving the Watergate tapes are doubtless interesting, and it is not at all wrong that they
should be seen as posing important questions of constitutional law. But, as in so many other instances, it
may also be useful to note that the crisis is upon us
not so much because of an issue that could not be
avoided otherwise, but that it is an issue inflated to
the level of crisis only in light of the breathtaking character of the president's highly diverting view of his
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authority. The president, it was argued in his brief
in court, is not subject to the judicial process at all. The
doctrine of. "separation of powers" precludes courts or
Congress from subjecting him to subpoena. He is the
sole judge, moreover, of what the public interest may
require in respect to papers or records within his custody. Neither courts nor Congress may presume to
second guess a claim of executive privilege or to supererogate an authority to require an explanation of its
basis or sufficiency. It is simply a matter entirely within
executive discretion alone. Like domestic surveillance
and the Fourth Amendment? Like appointing justices
to the Supreme Court? Like the power of war? Like
the power to impound funds and the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully ignored? Yes, evidently much
like these.
Disdain for a Tacky Quotation
Last summer we watched with growing interest (and
not a little apprehension) as John Ehrlichman toughed
it out before the Senate select committee, laying claim
to presidential powers of burglary as the president alone
might think appropriate in the interest of national security. Is the Fourth Amendment subject to suspension
by an act of executive privilege? The mere suggestion
is disturbing, but there was Mr. Ehrlichman's very able
counsel lecturing Senator Ervin that it might be so.
At least, he pointed out, the Supreme Court had not
had occasion to hold otherwise when the president
claimed an interest in "national security." What had
happened, Senator Talmadge asked, to the understanding that not even the king of England could enter the
most humble and dilapidated dwelling of his realm
without the owner's consent? Considerably "eroded,"
Mr. Ehrliehman suggested, with just a trace of disdain
at the senator's tacky quotation.
None of this is to say that the Watergate tapes cases
had an easy, foregone conclusion-that the courts were
bound to hold against the president or, indeed, that they
should so hold. Other issues involved in the cases might
trouble a conscientious court, and there is an important
area where claims of executive privilege should be
treated with deference: not necessarily by utterly abdicating and forswearing any power of judicial review,
as the president's brief argued, but simply in the careful and painstaking exercise of that review. A modest
court, not desiring to appear unsympathetic to the
needs of the presidency, even while being reluctant
to affirm such far-reaching absolutes as President Nixon
asserted, might struggle to find a less alarming basis
at once more moderate and fair.
Tapes Aren't Crucial to Select Committee
It could do so were it to determine. that the tapes
at best are of only marginal value to the select committee since the committee's objective is to determine
the need for additional corrupt practices legislation. Resolving particular conflicts of testimony regarding cer-

tain White House conversations may not be important
to its task, and accordingly it might not be unreasonable to sustain the claim of executive privilege under the
circumstances.
President Has Not Acted Consistently
The same analysis did not apply to the interest of
the special prosecutor, since he was charged with the
different task of determining whether existing criminal
statutes (such as those concerning perjury and obstruction of justice) have been violated. Resolving conflicts
of testimony by the possible corrooorative (or exonerating) value of the tapes would be highly relevant to
his responsibilities. But as to him, exactly as Charles
Alan Wright, the president's counsel, suggested, there
was also an alternative to forcing disclosure of the tapes
contrary to the will of the president. If the court had
concluded that indictments ought not be returned against
persons when the president withholds material possibly
vital to their prosecution or defense, it may simply declare that there can be no indictments or trials.
This need not have been the result, of course, and
the case on the other side is itself very impressive-most
especially as the president had not acted consistently with
his own claim of a need to maintain the confidentiality
of the conversations or even the confidentiality of the
tapes he loaned to Mr. Haldeman. In confronting the
courts with a direct challenge that the president is wholly immune to any inquiry at all, however, his lawyers
may have encouraged the courts to find a way to avoid
that issue, rather than to appear to, act from animus
toward the president and to accept the blame.
"Toughing It Out" Is a Last Resort
Whatever the, outcome in particular cases, there is
nonetheless a more depressing pattern that has emerged
from this strategy of toughing it out with the law. The
more generous view, that the president is simply an
extraordinary activist who cares deeply about the separation of powers and means only to protect the integrity
of his office from corrosive jealousies of a petty Congress and a permissive judiciary, is scarcely maintainable
anymore. Rather, toughing it out with the law has been
reduced to the most enfeebled function, a habitual last
line of defense whenever nothing else is left to say.
In this sense, the Watergate tapes may even be a paradigm case in which the questionable propriety of a decision is sought to be submerged in the very different issue
of technical constitutionality. The president displayed no
seemly concern for confidentiality in freely lending his
tapes to the friendly witness, Mr. Haldeman, for instance. It is difficult to become indignant with Herblock's cartoon impression of how the president evidently saw it: "It's a privilege," he says brightly, as he
hands over the tapes to Mr. Haldeman.
Possibly it was a privilege in the same sense that the
Constitution may not forbid the president so to conduct
himself, although it remains to be seen whether even this
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is true, but it scarcely seems to matter a great dcalthe list of "privileges" has simply, gotten out of hand.
Milk dealers are allowed a sudden price rise following
organized- contributions for the president's personal benefit. The LT.T. case is suddenly settled after a $400,000
gift. American Airlines ransoms itself front political skyjacking. Two plumbers "misunderstand" instructions
and burglarize a psychiatrist's office. The acting director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation also "misunderstands" and burns a file containing a falsified record
implicating a former president in the assassination of a
foreign head of state. Contributions given for campaign
purposes are diverted to the defense of individuals under
indictment for criminal invasion of opposition offices.
Congress is lied to about the respected sanctity of a
neutral country, and reports are falsified to make it
believable. Letters are fabricated to misrepresent public
reaction to presidential policy in mining foreign harbors, and polls are manipulated to demonstrate widespread support. A federal judge is invited to consider a
presidential appointment while presiding over a criminal
trial in which the administration has a direct political
interest. Following a thorough investigation that was
never held, a firm statement clearing all White House
personnel of any involvement is issued. Co-operation is
pledged, assurances are provided that no one isto be
protected, but what may be useful evidence is curtained in secrecy save for the most safe and symbiotic
witness, even while the president's counsel is advising

a court that confidentiality of the evidence from all
others is so important to the president as to warrant the
possible abandonment of indictment or prosecution as
an alternative to any further disclosure whatever.
Merely interesting questions of law? An issue of privilege, perhaps, or one of separation of powers? Or,
rather. a dcspcrate strategy to avoid the inevitable consequences of incredible hubris and overwhelming scandal?
From one office window at the law school where
President Nixon was an excellent student more than
thirty years ago, admittedly, the view I have of all this
is far from perfect. Increasingly these days, however, it
is pretty much deja vu.
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Notice by the Board of Elections
The following jurisdictions will elect a
state delegate for a three-year term beginning at the adjournment of the 1974 annual meeting and ending at the adjournmeat of the 1977 annual meeting:
Montana
Alabama
New Mexico
Alaska
North Carolina
California
North Dakota
Florida
Pennsylvania
Hawaii
Tennessee
Kansas
Vermont
Kentucky
Virginia
M assachusetts
Wisconsin
Missouri
Nominating petitions for all state delegates to be elected in 1974 must be filed
with the Board of Elections at American
Bar Association headquarters not later
than January 30, 1974. All nominating
petitions will be published in the March,
1974, issue of the American Bar AssociaJournal.
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While it is desirable that more than
the required minimum of twenty-five
names of members of the Association appear on a nominating petition, only twen-
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ty-five names of signers of any petition
will be published, as provided by Section
6.3 (b) of the Association's Constitution.
Only signatures of members of the Association will be counted. Each nominating petition must be accompitnied by a
typewritten list of the names and addressesof the signers in the order in which
they appear on the petition. The petition
must be accompanied also by a seventyfive word biographical sketch of the
nominee. Forms for this purpose will be
provided. The biographical sketch will be
included in the ballot material seat to
each Association member in the state for
which the nominee is a candidate for the
office of state delegate.
A candidate for nominee aisd all signers must be members of the Association
whose membership is accredited to the
state where the election is being held.
There is no limit to the number of candidates who may be nominated in any state,
and the nominations are made only on
the initiative of members themselves.
Each nominee for the office of state
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